But the state system stemming from the social contract was also anarchist (without direction). Just as individuals in the state of nature were sovereign, guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, states now acted in their own interests in competition. Thus, states, like the natural state, were undoubtedly in conflict because there was no (more powerful) ruler over the state capable of imposing by force on everyone a system such as laws on social contracts. In fact, Hobbes` work served as the basis for the realist theories of international relations established by EH Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Hobbes wrote in Leviathan that people (“we”) needed the “terrible power of a power,” otherwise people will not see the law of reciprocity, “will (briefly) harm others as we would.” Legal scholar Randy Barnett argued that while a company`s presence in the territory may be necessary for approval, it does not amount to the approval of all the rules that the company could establish regardless of its content. A second prerequisite for approval is that the rules are consistent with the underlying principles of justice and the protection of natural and social rights and have procedures in place to effectively protect those rights (or freedoms). This is what was done by O.A. Brownson discusses, who argued that there are, in a certain sense, three “constitutions”: first, the constitution of nature, which encompasses all that the founders call “natural law”; second, the composition of society, a set of unwritten and widely understood rules for society, which is constituted by a social contract before the formation of a government, thus establishing the third, a state constitution. In order to reach an agreement, a necessary condition is that the rules be constitutional in this sense. With M as the consultative configuration; R rules, principles or parameters; I (hypothetical) persons in the initial position or in the initial natural state who conclude the social contract; and I* am the individuals in the real world who follow the social contract. The agreement was implemented unofficially and independently of the Belgian government-in-exile and never obtained official status, but remained an influential document of post-war politics.
Many of their forecasts would be satisfied by the social reforms launched by Achille Van Acker in December 1944.  The pact was seen as the beginning of the consensual politics that characterises post-war Belgian democracy and as an entry into more peaceful social relations.  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) advocated a concept of social contract in which the individual would not cede his sovereignty to others. . . .